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Available online 12 May 2016AbstractGenerally, the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of a subsea Blowout Preventer (BOP) is evaluated by determining the Probability of Failure on
Demand (PFD), a low demand mode evaluation indicator. However, some SIL results are above the PFD's effective area despite the subsea BOP's
demand rate being within the PFD's effective range. Determining a Hazardous Event Frequency (HEF) that can cover all demand rates could be
useful when establishing the effective BOP SIL. This study focused on subsea BOP functions that follow guideline 070 of the Norwegian Oil and
Gas. Events that control subsea well kicks are defined. The HEF of each BOP function is analyzed and compared with the PFD by investigating
the frequency for each event and the demand rate for the components. In addition, risk control options related to PFD and HEF improvements are
compared, and the effectiveness of HEF as a SIL verification for subsea BOP is assessed.
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(HEF)1. Introduction
Following the Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of
Mexico, attention has focused on subsea Blowout Preventers
(BOP). The subsea BOP is a safety-related instrumented sys-
tem used during well drilling and well intervention operations.
Management of well bore pressures to control well kicks is
important because of the potential damage of such kicks to the
environment. Moreover, kick control is essential to prevent
kick-related accidents that may harm people and well assets.
The subsea BOP plays a vital role in the mitigation of damages
and the prevention of accidents.
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) have been used in the
oil and gas industry for years in order to control and mitigate* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: roory2@snu.ac.kr (S. Kim).
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2092-6782/Copyright © 2016 Society of Naval Architects of Korea. Production and
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).risks. The SIS, as defined by standard 61508 of the Interna-
tional Electrotechnical Commission (IEC 61508, 2010), is an
instrumented system that can be used to implement one or
more Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF). Establishment of
Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) is a fundamental concept within
the IEC 61508 standard. A SIL consists of four possible
discrete probabilistic levels that are used to specify the safety
integrity requirements of SIF, which are allocated to
Safety-Related Systems (SRS). In order to allocate SIL to
SRS, the IEC 61508 standard classifies SRS into those with
low demand or high demand/continuous modes of operation.
Based on the definitions within IEC 61508-4 (2010), the
boundary between the low and high demand modes for a SIF
is determined by a demand rate of one per year. The IEC
61508-4 (2010) classification is an improvement over the
previous definition (IEC 61508-4, 1997), which categorized
the operational mode based on both demand rate and proof
test rate.hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
Nomenclature
AP Annular Preventer
A/PR Annular and Pipe Ram
BOP blowout preventer
BSR Blind Shear Ram
CCF Common Cause Failure
CV Choke Valve
DV Diverter Valve
DS Diverter System
EUC Equipment Under Control
HEF Hazardous Event Frequency
HPU Hydraulic Power Unit
KV Kill Valve
MDD Mean Demand Duration
MooN M-out-of-N
MTBK Mean Time Between Kicks
NOG the Norwegian Oil and Gas
OREDAOffshore REliabilityDAta
PDS reliability of computer-based safety systems,
Norwegian acronym
PFD Probability of Failure on Demand
PFDMooN-system Probability of Failure on Demand of a
system having MooN voting logic Probability of
PFH Failure per Hour
PRP Pipe Ram Preventer
PV Pilot Valve
RBD Reliability Block Diagram
SIF Safety instrumented function
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SIS Safety instrumented system
SRS Safety-Related System
SV drill string Safety Valve
TCS Topside Control System
TPB Topside Push Button
lcomponent failure rate of a component
lde demand rate
(lde)system demand rate of a system
lDU rate of Dangerous Undetected failure
lkick frequency of a subsea well kick
t test interval
tinterval test interval having an ‘interval’ period
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became easier. However, the validity of SIS evaluating param-
eters over the demand rate range remained unclear. The SIS
evaluating parameters give single representative values for low
and high demand mode, regardless of the actual demand rate;
thus, if a SIS is classified as in the low or high demand mode,
then its demand rate is not considered during evaluation;
moreover, demand rate effects are not reflected within that
evaluation. In addition, different evaluation approaches for the
two modes may lead to distinct SIL results at the boundary
between the two demand rates. A slight gap in the demand rate
near a SIS boundary can result in a markedly different evalu-
ation. Moreover, how well industry representatives comply withapplying such evaluations is unclear. For example, industry
representatives may just follow rules or guides without
analyzing the SIS demand rate during field development.
The subsea BOP is a SIS employed during drilling of a
subsea well and is comprised of multiple redundant components
that perform the same task. The subsea BOP is considered to
function in the low demand rate mode and is evaluated by using
the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) method, a standard
SIS evaluation method for equipment in the low demand mode.
Recent research (Cai et al., 2012a, b) has evaluated the perfor-
mance of subsea BOP under the premise that they are in the low
demand mode. Kim et al. (2014) applied demand rates when
evaluating BOP performance by using a Markov model, but that
study did not include a SIS evaluation of BOP function. Ac-
cording to guideline 070 of the Norwegian Oil and Gas (NOG
070, 2004), the SIL evaluation method proposes a standard
that provides minimal satisfaction for two subsea BOP func-
tions. However, a more realistic method of analysis is necessary
because some BOP components that operate different functions
are not independent. Moreover, some BOP components that
undergo repetitive usage for different function operate in the
high demand rate mode. Thus, the subsea BOP's demand rate is
mostly within the PFD's effective range, but some components
have a demand rate that is outside the PFD's effective range.
Even though there is a demarcation point between low and
high demand modes for a SIS, the SIS evaluation parameters
PFD and Probability of Failure per Hour (PFH) may not reflect
the actual situation, especially near the borderline between the
two modes. To overcome this limitation, Misumi and Sato
(1999) proposed using a Hzardous Event Frequency (HEF)
evaluation method, which considers both demand rate and
demand duration when evaluating a SIS. Bukowski (2006)
suggested a relatively simple SIS model that incorporated a
process demand into a fail dangerous state (PFDPRS; i.e., the
probability of being in a state of fail that is dangerous and at
which the process requires to be shut down), an approach that
showed the effect of process demand on SIS performance.
Innal et al. (2010) researched the characteristics of PFH,
which lies in the same domain as HEF. Liu and Rausand
(2011) researched on reliability assessment of SIS to
different demand modes with concept of hazardous events. Jin
et al. (2011) stated that a scenario-based formula (i.e., an
analytic solution of HEF) for a single component supported
the HEF results obtained from PFD for the low demand mode
and the HEF results obtained from PFH for the high demand
mode. They also showed that a Markov model, which
considered demand rate and demand duration, produced re-
sults that supported the results from a scenario-based formula.
However, further HEF research is needed because industry
representatives have become familiar with the PFD and PFH
concepts, but not with the use of HEF.
In this paper, the use of HEF as a SIS evaluation parameter
is proposed as an alternative to using PFD at demand rates
near the boundary between the low and high demand modes.
The comparison of HEF and PFD results required confirma-
tion that the SIL range for PFH could be used as a HEF-based
SIL range. The validity of HEF as the SIS evaluation
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tions that are defined in NOG 070 (2004).
The remaining portions of this paper are organized as
follow. In section two, equations presenting various voting
logics for PFD, PFH, and HEF are defined. A range for HEF is
proposed for each SIL. Section three defines two functions of
an NOG 070 subsea BOP, and the components used in the
analyses are clarified. The events occurring from a subsea well
kick during the drilling operation are defined by using event
tree analysis. Section four evaluates and compares two subsea
BOP functions by using PFD and HEF analyses. Moreover,
PFD is investigated for all events. The demand rate of the
events and the components of the subsea BOP are derived
from the PFD results of the two events and are used to assess
the HEF results. In addition, the PFD, HEF, and PFH results
for two subsea BOP functions are compared and there is a
discussion of their limitations. In section five, risk control
options related to both PFD and HEF are proposed. Also,
configurations that assign a pod to each function are discussed
in section six. Finally, section seven concludes the paper.
2. SIS evaluation2.1. PFD and PFH for MooN voting logic (PDS method)A SIS can operate in two modes depending on the demand
rate. If the demand rate is less than one per year, the SIS is in
the low demand mode and PFD can be used to evaluate the
SIS. For a system that incorporates the MooN (M-out-of-N)
voting logic, the use of PFD as an evaluation tool falls within
the PDS method (a Norwegian acronym indicating the reli-
ability of computer-based safety systems, Hauge et al., 2010),
which was developed for quantification of the reliability and
availability of the SIS. Based on the MooN voting logic,
PFDMooN ¼ CMooN$b$lDU$t=2þN!=
fðNMþ 2Þ!$ðM 1Þ!g$ðlDU$tÞNMþ1; ð1Þ
where lDU is the dangerous undetected failure rate, t is the
test interval, and the MooN voting (M < N) indicates that at
least M modules of N components should be operated nor-
mally. When considering the common cause failure for the
various voting, the modifier CMooN is in Table 1.
A SIS demand rate of more than one per year is indicative
of the high demand mode, and in that case, PFH is used to
evaluate the SIS. The PDS method defines PFH which is used
as the high demand mode's standard method of evaluation for
the MooN voting logic asTable 1
CMooN factors for different voting logics (Hauge et al., 2010).
CMooN N ¼ 1 N ¼ 2 N ¼ 3 N ¼ 4 N ¼ 5 N ¼ 6
M ¼ 1 e 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.21 0.17
M ¼ 2 e e 2.0 1.1 0.7 0.4
M ¼ 3 e e e 2.9 1.8 1.1
M ¼ 4 e e e e 3.7 2.4
M ¼ 5 e e e e e 4.3PFHMooN ¼ CMooN$b$lDU þN!=
fðNMþ 1Þ!$ðM 1Þ!g$ðlDU$tÞNMþ1

t

:
ð2Þ2.2. HEFThe HEF is calculated as the average frequency of hazardous
events per hour (Rausand, 2014). Hazardous events occur when
a SIS fails to deliver its function at the moment that function is
demanded. When a SIS has failed and the SIS is demanded or
when a SIS is demanded and the SIS does not actuate, a haz-
ardous event occurs. However, if a SIS has failed, but there is no
actuation demand, then no hazardous event occurs.
To estimate HEF accurately, situations that can happen to a
SIS have to be identified, and equations must be developed that
represent each situation, as suggested by Misumi and Sato
(1999); however, their approach is cumbersome. The Markov
model, which can be used to express various states of a system,
can also be used to determine HEF (Jin et al., 2011; Kim et al.,
2014; Liu and Rausand, 2011). However, further researches into
various voting logics are needed if the Markov model is to be
used for a complicated system. Rausand (2014) defined HEF
where demand has no duration in a low demand SIF as
HEFMooN ¼ PFDMooN$lde: ð3Þ
This equation determines the frequency of dangerous situ-
ation from a SIS failure when a safety-critical system with
PFDMooN is required to perform its function at a demand rate
of lde. Rausand (2014) also introduced a method to obtain
HEF by considering Mean Demand Duration (MDD) as rep-
resented by
HEFz

PFDavg þ lSF$MDD

lde; ð4Þ
where l

SF is the average dangerous failure rate of a SIF during
a function-demanded situation and can be regarded as PFH.
This failure rate is usually higher than the normal condition
failure rate, l, because the SIS is being exposed to a more
severe condition. However, in this paper, this term is not
considered due to an absence of information on l

SF and the
MDD of the subsea BOP components.
2.2.1. SIL range for HEF
As the demand rate increases, it is more likely that the
system is under demand when a SIS failure occurs and the
PFH is therefore a good measure for HEF (Rausand, 2014). In
such a case, SIS failure in the high demand mode will lead to
an immediate hazardous event. The boundary of both low and
high demand modes is less than one per year or not, and a
demand rate of one per year is equivalent to a demand rate of
approximately 1.14e4 per hour. Therefore, the SIL range for
PFD becomes equal to the SIL range for PFH when the SIL
range for PFD is multiplied by the demand rate of approximate
1e4 per hour (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. SIL range for PFH, PFD and HEF.
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low demand mode SIS component is similar to the frequency
obtained by multiplying the PFD and the demand rate (Jin et al.,
2011). In addition, HEF has a range of values similar that of
PFH. Therefore, it is reasonable to evaluate HEF by applying
the SIL range for PFH, as shown in Fig. 1, since HEF is derived
by multiplying the PFD and the demand rate.
3. Subsea BOP configuration and input data
The subsea BOP functions as well-controlling equipment
with an important role as a safety barrier when a subsea well is
being explored or developed. According to NOG 070 a subsea
BOP has two SIF and they require a minimum SIL 2 safety
approach (Table 2).
The NOG 070 also indicates that to set the requirement
level at SIL 3 for two SIF of a subsea BOP would result in the
need to change the existing control system, and it would be
necessary to include additional rams in the standard BOP as-
sembly. Because of challenges associated with such additional
requirements, the two SIF of a subsea BOP should meet the
minimum SIL 2 requirements.
In this section, the SIL of the Annular and Pipe Ram (A/
PR) function and the Blind Shear Ram (BSR) function of a
subsea BOP were evaluated through the application of both
PFD and HEF in order to determine whether the HEF
approach would meet NOG 070 requirements.3.1. Subsea BOP configuration andwell control procedureA subsea BOP selected for the analysis is the Class VI BOP
stack which has two annular preventers, one BSR preventer,Table 2
Minimum SIL requirements e drilling related safety functions (NOG 070,
2004).
Safety function SIL Functional boundaries for given
SIL requirement/comments
Drilling BOP function
Closing of relevant
BOP valve(s)
in order to prevent blowout
and/or well leak
2 Annular/pipe ram (A/PR) function
- Seal around drill pipe
2 Blind shear ram (BSR) function
- Seal an open hole
- Shear drill pipe and seal off welland three pipe ram preventers (Fig. 2 (a)). It is usually
designed for well operations requiring 10e15,000 psi pressure
containing capabilities and tapered work strings (WEST E. S.,
2009). Above sea level, there is an annular diverter system that
can seal the well annulus and a diverter valve that can release
hydraulic pressure to keep the internal pressure of the drilling
riser under normal conditions. Above the drill string, there is a
safety valve that can seal the drill string annulus. Moreover, on
the topside there are push buttons on the driller's and tool
pusher's consoles that can send input commands to all com-
ponents (Cai et al., 2012a). The driller and tool pusher con-
soles have the same roles, but they may send commands
differently. Input commands.usually installed redundantly
because that system should guarantee high system reliability.
Thus, the control system is deemed redundant in this paper.
Fig. 2 (b) shows the components and component routing
related to the A/PR and BSR functions. The push-button
system, the control system, and the two pods are used in
common for those two functions even though they are SIS
elements that are usually functionally independent.
In general, when a subsea well kick occurs during drilling,
the events and procedures shown in Fig. 3 (Hauge et al., 2012)
are undertaken to control the well kick. Table 3 provides de-
tails for each event shown in Fig. 3.
The subsea BOP A/PR function seals the annulus around
the drill pipe and is event 2 in Table 3 (events 2A and 2B). The
BSR function covers the hole and seals the well by cutting the
drill pipe and is event 5 in Table 3 (events 5A and 5B). Event 2
is subdivided into 2A and 2B depending on the location of the
hydrocarbons, whereas event 5 is subdivided depending on
whether there is flow inside the BOP. However, these subsea
BOP functions, as described in NOG 070, are the same
regardless of hydrocarbon location or flow inside the BOP.3.2. Input data for SIL evaluationThe input data used for the analyses are listed in Table 4.
WEST E. S. (2009) mentioned that there were no correlations
between failure rates and water depth. The failure rate data for
the safety valve and the diverter valve installed topside
exclude data for the pilot valve (Hauge and Onshus, 2010).
The failure rate of the pilot valve is used during evaluation of
the safety and diverter valves. The annular preventer is
generally used as part of the diverter system, and the diverter
system's failure rate is assumed to be the same as that of the
annular preventer. The failure rate of the pod is based on a
Multiplex Electro-Hydraulic (MUX) type controller that re-
ceives an electric signal from topside and activates a hydrau-
lically powered actuator valve.
The common cause failure was considered using the beta
factor model. The most important thing of using the beta
factor model is what value is used for the beta factor. Hauge
et al. (2015) suggested the beta factor based on field experi-
ence for several SIS components. However, the research on the
beta factors for the subsea BOP components has not developed
well, so the well-known existing methods were used to obtain
the beta factors. The beta factors for the topside push button
Fig. 2. Subsea BOP components classification. (a) schematic subsea BOP configuration; (b) functional classification of simplified subsea BOP structure (the solid line is
the function of the annulus and the pipe ram preventer (referred as A/PR) and the dash line is the function of the blind shear ram preventer (referred as BSR)).
Fig. 3. Event tree for subsea well kick control (Hauge et al., 2012).
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Onshus (2010). The beta factors for the pod, the annular/
pipe ram preventer and the choke and kill valve were esti-
mated by IEC 61508-6 Annex D (2010).The function test is based on NORSOK D-010 Annex A
(2004). In the case of the pod and A/PR preventer, a test at
70% of working pressure is performed every 6 months. A
working pressure test of the BSR preventer is performed every
Table 3
Event description of Fig. 3 (Hauge et al., 2012).
No. Event
1 Hydrocarbon inflow is detected before
it reaches BOP (early kick detection)
2A BOP seals annulus with all hydrocarbons(HC)
below BOP (i.e. given successful kick detection)
2B BOP seals annulus with flowing hydrocarbons in
riser (i.e. early kick detection has failed)
3 Mud with appropriate weight is pumped
into well and the choke lines vent gas and
light mud from well
4 Drill string safety valve closes drill string
5A Shear ram cuts and seals well e no
flow through BOP
5B Shear ram cuts and seals well e flow through BOP
6 The diverter valve opens to vent gas and mud
away from installation
Table 4
Input data for PFD calculation.
Component Failure rate,
l [per 10f hour]
CCF beta
factor, b [%]
Test interval,
ta
Topside push button 0.4b 3b Each 6 months
(perfect test)Topside control system 4.9b 7b
Drill string
safety valve
(ex. pilot)
2.1b e
Diverter system 11.2f e
Diverter valve
(ex. pilot)
2.1b e
Pilot valve 0.8b e
Hydraulic power unit 0.9c e
Choke and kill valve 0.4d 5e
Pod (MUX) 104.7d 5e
Annular preventer 11.2d 5e
Pipe ram preventer 6.5d
BSR preventer 5.4d e
a Hauge et al. (2012).
b Hauge and Onshus (2010).
c OREDA (2009).
d WEST E. S. (2009).
e IEC 61508-6 Annex D (2010).
f Assumption from annular preventerd.
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are tested every 6 months regularly and the test is the perfect
test which means all failure are detected during the 6 months
interval test.
4. PFD and HEF of subsea BOP4.1. PFD calculationThe PFDs of events 1 and 3 were obtained from previously
reported data (Hauge et al., 2012), whereas the PFDs of events 2,
4, 5, and 6 were derived from input data. Operational failure for
events 2 and 5 also used previously reported data (Hauge et al.,
2012). To evaluate the PFD for events 2, 4, 5, and 6, Reliability
Block Diagrams (RBD) were constructed for each event. The
CCF block is belonging to the following redundant components.The RBD for event 2 is shown in Fig. 4. To control well
kick, a command is inputted by push buttons on topside. The
command is delivered through control systems and final ele-
ments are activated. The pods receive the signal from the
control system and activate annular preventers or pipe ram
preventers. Two annular preventers can be used at the same
time according to circumstances. However, one pipe ram
preventer is usually used to perform the A/PR function even
though three pipe rams are installed in the subsea BOP. Two
variable bore ram preventers which can be used for various
diameters of pipes and one fixed ram preventer which can be
used for only one pipe diameter are generally equipped in the
subsea BOP. The lowest pipe ram preventer is used for the
subsea BOP test and the middle and upper pipe ram preventers
are used for the well kick control. However, the pipe ram
preventers seldom activate at the same time because the
sealing bore size ranges of preventers are different even
though they are the variable bore ram preventers. The hy-
draulic power unit supplies the hydraulic power to the annular
preventers to keep sealing the annulus when the annular pre-
venters activate. The choke and kill valves are equipped to
depressurize or to pressurized the annulus pressure.
The PFD of each of the components is
PFD1oo2-TPB ¼ bTPB$lTPB$t=2þ ðlTPB$tÞ2=3¼ 2:730e 5;
ð5Þ
PFD1oo2TCS ¼ bTCS$lTCS$t=2þ ðlTCS$tÞ2=3¼ 9:047e 4;
ð6Þ
PFD1oo1HPU ¼ lHPU$t=2¼ 1:971e 3; ð7Þ
PFD1oo2Pod ¼ bPod$lPod$t=2þ ðlPod$tÞ2=3¼ 8:157e 2;
ð8Þ
PFD1oo3A=PR ¼ C1oo3$bA=PR$lA=PR$t=2þ

lA=PR$t
3
=4
¼ 5:286e 4; ð9Þ
lA=PR ¼
ðlAPÞ2$ðlPRPÞ
ð1=3Þ
; ð10Þ
and
PFD1oo2CV ¼ PFD1oo2KV ¼ bCV$lCV$t=2þ ðlCV$tÞ2=3
¼ 4:381e 5;
ð11Þ
where PFD1oo2-TPB, bTPB and lTPB are the PFD, the beta factor
and the failure rate, respectively, of the redundant topside
Push-Button System (TPB), and PFD1oo2-TCS, bTCS and lTCS
are the PFD, the beta factor and the failure rate, respectively,
of the redundant Topside Control System (TCS). PFD1oo1-HPU
and lHPU are the PFD and the failure rate, respectively, of the
Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU). PFD1oo2-Pod, bPod and lPod are
the PFD, the beta factor and the failure rate, respectively of a
pod system having blue and yellow pods. PFD1oo3-A/PR, C1oo3,
Fig. 4. Reliability block diagram for event 2 (A/PR function).
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the failure rate, respectively, of the two annular preventers and
the one pipe ram preventers, whereas lAP and lPRP are the
failure rates of an annular preventer and a pipe ram preventer,
respectively. Considering that the system is composed of
different components, which are performing the same func-
tion, the representative failure rate in Eq. (10) can be obtained
from the work reported by Hauge et al. (2012). PFD1oo2-CV/KV,
bCV and lCV are the PFD, the beta factor and the failure rate,
respectively, of the redundant choke and kill valves (CK, VK).
By adding each of the PFD values, the PFDE2 for sealing
annulus of event 2 (E2) is
PFDE2 ¼ PFD1oo2TPB þ PFD1oo2TCS þ PFD1oo1HPU
þ PFD1oo2Pod þ PFD1oo3A=PR þ PFD1oo2CV
þ PFD1oo2KV
¼ 8:508e 2: ð12Þ
The RBD for event 4, that is, the closing of the drill string
annulus via the safety valve, is shown in Fig. 5. After the
annulus is sealed by A/PR function, the safety valve is acti-
vated to seal the inside of the drill pipe. The command from
the topside push buttons is delivered through the topside
control system to the safety valve.
The PFD of event 4, PFDE4, is given by
PFD1oo1PV ¼ ðlPV$tÞ=2¼ 1:752e 3; ð13Þ
PFD1oo1SV ¼ ðlSV$tÞ=2¼ 4:599e 3; ð14Þ
and
PFDE4 ¼ PFD1oo2TPB þ PFD1oo2TCS þ PFD1oo1PV
þ PFD1oo1SV
¼ 7:283e 3; ð15Þ
where PFD1oo1-PV and lPV are the PFD and the failure rate,
respectively, of the Pilot Valve (PV) of the drill string safetyvalve, and PFD1oo1-SV and lSV are the PFD and the failure rate,
respectively, of the drill string Safety Valve (SV).
The RBD for event 5 is shown in Fig. 6. The BSR preventer
acts a role as the last safety barrier when all of the primary
safety measures fail. The BSR preventer cuts the drill sting
and seals the well bore. The command from the topside push
buttons is delivered through the topside control system to the
pods to make BSR preventer activate.
Herein, the PFD for event 5 (PFDE5), that is, cutting the
drill string and sealing the well with a BSR preventer, is
PFD1oo1BSR ¼ ðlBSR$tÞ=2¼ 1:183e 2; ð16Þ
and
PFDE5 ¼ PFD1oo2TPB þ PFD1oo2TCS þ PFD1oo2Pod
þ PFD1oo1BSR
¼ 9:432e 2; ð17Þ
where PFD1oo1-BSR and lBSR are the PFD and the failure rate,
respectively, of the BSR preventer.
The RBD for event 6 is shown in Fig. 7. The diverter
system releases the hydrocarbon inside the riser to depres-
surize before the hydrocarbon reaches the topside. When the
command from the topside push buttons delivered through the
topside control.system to the diverter system, the diverter seals
the annulus and the diverter valve is open to release the hy-
drocarbon through the bypass.
The PFD for activation of the diverter system for the event
6, PFDE6, is
PFD1oo1DS ¼ ðlDS$tÞ=2¼ 2:453e 2; ð18Þ
PFD1oo1DV ¼ ðlDV$tÞ=2¼ 4:599e 3; ð19Þ
and
Fig. 5. Reliability block diagram for event 4.
Fig. 6. Reliability block diagram for event 5.
Fig. 7. Reliability block diagram for event 6.
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þ PFD1oo1PV þ PFD1oo1DV
¼ 3:181e 2; ð20Þ
where PFD1oo1-DS and lDS are the PFD and the failure rate,
respectively, of the diverter system (DS), and PFD1oo1-DV and
lDV are the PFD and the failure rate, respectively, of the
Diverter Valve (DV).
The PFD values for each event obtained through the above
equations are listed in Table 5. A previously reported value
(Hauge et al., 2012) was used for events 1 and 3. According to
Hauge et al. (2012), operator failure was considered as the
source of event 2. When hydrocarbons pass the riser through
the BOP (i.e., event 2B), an operator's stress level mayTable 5
PFD for events.
Event no. PFD Note (Hauge et al., 2012)
1 (0.05) Statistically
2A 0.0851þ(0.01) ¼ 0.0951 operator failure
2B 0.0851þ(0.05) ¼ 0.1351 operator failure
(more stressful)
3 (0.2) Statistically
4 0.0073
5A 0.0943þ(0.05) ¼ 0.1443 failure to hit
a tool joint
5B 0.0943þ(0.1) ¼ 0.1943 failure to adjust the
position (more stressful)
6 0.0318increase, which can result in a higher probability of failure.
Similarly, it is difficult to undertake event 5 at the right
location along the drill string if the flow is within the BOP
(i.e., event 5B). As a result, the probability of operator failure
is higher than when there is no flow in the BOP (i.e., event
5A). To determine the total PFD of all events, the PFDs of
each event should be added (Table 5).4.2. Demand rate and HEF of a subsea BOPThe frequency of occurrence of a kick taking place during
development of an oil well is indicated by the Mean Time
Between Kicks (MTBK). According to Holand (2001), in the
US Gulf of Mexico and outer continental shelf area, one kick
occurs every 111 days of BOP operation. Based on those data,
the frequency of a subsea well kick, lkick, is
lkick ¼ 1=MTBK¼ 1=ð111  24Þ ¼ 3:75e 4½per hour: ð21Þ
The frequency of a subsea well kick and the PFD of each of
the events presented in Table 5 were used to construct Fig. 8.
From the probabilities presented in Fig. 8, the demand rate
of each event can be investigated. For example, the frequency
of occurrence of event 2A can be obtained as following
ðldeÞ2A ¼ lkick$1ðYÞ ¼ lkick$0:95¼ 3:56e 4½per hour
¼ 3:12½per year; ð22Þ
Fig. 8. Frequency of subsea well kick and probabilities of events for subsea well kick control.
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frequency of event 2A is equal to the demand rate of event 2A.
Similarly, the demand rates for two functions of the subsea can
be determined from the data in Fig. 8 and are shown in Table
6. Five scenarios were identified to require the A/PR function
and BSR function together. The demand rate for each function
was different for each scenario.
The scenarios no. 1 and 2 show that the demand rate of the
A/PR function is bigger than one per year which is the
boundary of the low and high demand mode in IEC 61508Table 6
Demand rate for BOP functions.
No. Scenario A/PR fun
(Event 2)
Demand
lde [per h
1 kick/ 1(Y)/ 2A(Y)/ 3(N)/ 4(N)/ 5A 3.56E0
2 kick/ 1(Y)/ 2A(N)/ 5B 3.56E0
3 kick/ 1(N)/ 2B(Y)/ 6(Y)/ 3(N)/ 4(N)/ 5A 1.88E0
4 kick/ 1(N)/ 2B(Y)/ 6(N)/ 4(N)/ 5A 1.88E0
5 kick/ 1(N)/ 2B(N)/ 5B 1.88E0(2010). It was found that the demand mode of the A/PR
function was changed by the scenario.
The scenario no. 2 could be happened more frequently than
other scenarios in Table 6. The demand rates of each of the
components for the analysis were obtained from the scenario
no. 2 of Table 6 and were listed in Table 7.
Based on the PFD and demand rate, the subsea BOP HEF
values for the A/PR function (i.e., event 2) and the BSR
function (i.e., event 5), are obtained by applying Eq. (3). The
HEF results are thus obtained byction
(2A or 2B)
BSR function
(Event 5) (5A or 5B)
Percentage
[%]
rate,
our]
Demand rate,
lde [per year]
Demand rate,
lde [per hour]
Demand rate,
lde [per year]
4 3.12 4.71E07 4.1E03 1.3
4 3.12 3.39E05 3.0E01 91.8
5 0.16 2.29E08 2.0E04 0.1
5 0.16 3.76E09 3.3E05 0.0
5 0.16 2.53E06 2.2E02 6.9
HEFE2 ¼ PFD1oo2TPB$ðldeÞTPB þ PFD1oo2TCS$ðldeÞTCS þ PFD1oo1HPU$ðldeÞHPU þ PFD1oo2Pod$ðldeÞPod þ PFD1oo3A=PR$ðldeÞA=PR
þ PFD1oo2CV$ðldeÞCV þ PFD1oo2KV$ðldeÞKV
¼ 9:727e 9þ 3:223e 7þ 7:022e 7þ 2:906e 5þ 1:883e 7þ 1:561e 8þ 1:561e 8¼ 3:031e 5
ð23Þ
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¼ 9:727e 9þ 3:223e 7þ 2:906e 5þ 4:007e 7¼ 2:979e 5 ð24Þ
Table 7
Demand rate for components.
Component Demand rate, lde [per hour]
Topside push button, (lde)TSB 3.56e4 (¼(lde)E2)
Topside control system,
(lde)TCS
3.56e4 (¼(lde)E2)
Hydraulic power unit,
(lde)HPU
3.56e4 (¼(lde)E4)
Pod (MUX), (lde)Pod 3.56e4 (¼(lde)E2)
Annular/Pipe ram preventer,
(lde)A/PR
3.56e4 (¼(lde)E2)
Choke and kill valve, (lde)CV
and (lde)KV
3.56e4 (¼(lde)E2)
BSR preventer, (lde)BSR 3.39e5 (¼(lde)E5)where HEFE2 is the HEF of event 2 and HEFE5 is the HEF of
event 5. Those results are compared with the PFD results in
Table 8.
When the SIS of the subsea BOP was evaluated with the
PFD calculations, two functions of the subsea BOP could not
satisfy the SIL 2 requirement. Also, when the SIS was eval-
uated with the HEF calculations, neither the A/PR function nor
the BSR function met the SIL 2 requirement. Sensitivity
analysis was performed on each component's PFD and HEF
values for event 2 (A/PR function) and event 5 (BSR func-
tion). The analyses considered that 70% of the PFD and HEF
values of each component influenced their rank within the
total PFD and HEF. During those analyses, an l2-norm was
used with the summation of the squares of the normalized
differences being one.
Fig. 9 (a) shows that the pod component was dominant in
both the PFD and HEF results for the A/PR function. Similarly,
the pod component was also dominant in the BSR function.PFHE5 ¼ PFH1oo2TPB þ PFH1oo2TCS þ PFH1oo2Pod þ PFH1oo1BSR
¼ bTPB$lTPB þ ðlTPB$tÞ2=t
þ bTCS$lTCS þ ðlTCS$tÞ2=t
þ bPod$lPod þ ðlPod$tÞ2=t
þ lBSR: ¼ 5:911e 5 ð2However, the BSR preventer was a large part of the PFD value
because of a lack of redundancy, even though it had a low failure
rate. The BSR preventer is an important component as it is the
last component in the prevention of a kick-related accident;
however, it does have a low demand rate, resulting in the lack of
a BSR effect on HEF (Fig. 9 (b)). In contrast, the pod has a
relatively high demand rate and its failure rate is much higher
than that of the other components. When the pod is evaluated by
PFD, there is a possibility of misinterpretation because the pod is
more dangerous than suggested by the results.4.3. Comparison of PFD, PFH, and HEF for two BOP
functionsFig. 10 shows a comparison of the PFD, PFH, and HEF of
the A/PR and BSR functions of a subsea BOP. The PFH for the
A/PR and BSR functions were obtained from Eq. (2) as
follows
PFHE2 ¼ PFH1oo2TPB þ PFH1oo2TCS þ PFH1oo1HPU
þ PFH1oo2Pod þ PFH1oo3A=PR þ PFH1oo2CV
þ PFH1oo2KV
¼ bTPB$lTPB þ ðlTPB$tÞ2=t
þ bTCS$lTCS
þ ðlTCS$tÞ2=t
þ lHPU þ

bPod$lPod þ ðlPod$tÞ2=t

þ
n
C1oo3$bA=PR$lA=PR þ

lA=PR$t
3
=t
o
þ bCV$lCV
þ ðlCV$tÞ2=t
þ bCV$lCV þ ðlCV$tÞ2=t

¼ 5:488e 5
ð25Þ
and6Þ
Table 8
Comparison between the PFD and the HEF.
PFD SIL HEF SIL
Annular/pipe ram function
(Event 2)
8.508E02 1 3.031E05 0
Blind shear ram function
(Event 5)
9.432E02 1 2.979E05 0
Fig. 10. Comparison of PFD, PFH and HEF for the A/PR function and the
BSR function of the subsea BOP.
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mand mode SIS evaluation. However, in the present study the
A/PR function could be demanded over three times per year
(scenario no.1 and 2 of Table 6), and this is within the scope of
the PFH. The PFD of the two subsea BOP functions didn't
meet SIL 2 requirements, and the SIL from the PFH for those
functions were lower than the SIL from the PFD. The PFD
approach had tendency to underestimate the probability of
failure, whereas the PFH approach tended to overestimate the
probability of failure near the boundary between SIS demand
modes.
For this investigation, the BSR function was demanded less
than once per year (all scenarios of Table 6). However, the
topside push button, topside control, and pod systems were
demanded for the A/PR function over three times per year. The
pod was the dominant system component related to BSR
function failures. Moreover, the BSR function sequentially
followed the A/PR function; thus, the pod should be used first
to assess the A/PR function at the demand rate of the A/PR
function. The PFD approach may not reflect the components
used in other safety-critical systems. Moreover, the PFD as-
sumes that all SIS components are demanded less than once
per year and are operated independently. As a result, the PFD
can underestimate the probability of failure. The PFH was not
suitable for evaluating the BSR function, because the BSR
preventer is low demand mode equipment.
The HEF analysis produced reasonable values for the A/PR
and BSR functions. The HEF considers the demand rate and
can be applied over the full demand rate range of the SIS.
However, Eq. (3) is only valid for a zero-demand duration and
in near-boundary demand mode cases. In addition, HEFFig. 9. Sensitivity of components (blue block for the PFD and red comb pattern for the HEF). (a) component sensitivity of event 2; (b) component sensitivity o
event 5.becomes cumbersome when building scenario-based equations
due to the analytical solutions required for various situations.
The Markov model has emerged as a good numerical solution,
but it requires further development to enable it to be effective
for various voting logics and complicated systems.
5. Control options
For the two subsea BOP SIF in this study to meet the
minimum SIL 2 requirement (Table 2), a variety of control
options related to the PFD and HEF evaluations were assessed.5.1. Control option for PFDThe pod was the dominant component in both the A/PR and
BSR functions (control option no. 0 in Fig. 11). To satisfy the
minimum SIL 2 requirement, the pod could be controlled
further in order to improve the A/PR function and the BSR
function. One possible control option was the three pods
system. The industry field has recognized the importance of
the pod system, and there is a try to use three pods instead of
two pods. The control option no. 1 in Table 9 was the result of
the three pods system having 1oo3 voting logic. It showed thatf
Fig. 11. Sensitivity of components (green block for no. 1, blue comb pattern for no. 1 and red check pattern for no. 3 of Table 9). (a) component sensitivity of event
2; (b) component sensitivity of event 5.
Table 9
Control options for PFD.
No. Control option A/PR function (event 2) BSR function (event 5)
PFD SIL Reduction PFD SIL Reduction
0 Origin 8.51E02 1 0% 9.43E02 1 0%
1 3 Pod system 3.34E02 1 61% 4.26E02 1 55%
2 23% Pod failure rate 9.86E03 2 88% 1.91E02 1 80%
3 3 Pod & 52% Pod failure rate 9.89E03 2 88% 1.91E02 1 80%
4 3 Pod & 52% Pod failure rate
& 22% BSR failure rate
9.89E03 2 88% 9.91E03 2 89%
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for the A/PR and BSR functions. Another possible control
option for the pod would be to enhance the performance of the
pod and reduce its failure rate (control option no. 2 in Table 9).
To meet the SIL 2 requirement, a pod failure rate should be
reduced to 23% of the pod failure rate. Then, the PFD was
reduced by 88% for the A/PR function and 80% for the BSR
function. However, the BSR function could not meet the
requirement. In the case of the three pods system (control
option no. 1 of Table 9), the pod was still dominant to the PFD
in Fig. 11. The failure rate should be reduced to 52% of the
current failure rate to satisfy the SIL requirement (control
option no. 3 of Table 9). However, to enhance the performance
of the pod system was not enough to meet the SIL requirement
of the BSR function. In the case of the control option no. 3 in
Fig. 11 (b), the most dominant component is not the pod, but
the BSR preventer. The PFD results for the BSR function
indicate that the BSR preventer contributes a high portion of
the total PFD value. Some subsea BOP are equipped with two
BSR preventers (West E. S., 2009; five of thirty five subsea
BOP operating in the Gulf of Mexico), but typically a single
BSR preventer is used. Therefore, adding a redundant BSR
preventer was not deemed a good control option, and this
option was excluded from further consideration. BSR pre-
venter performance enhancement was used as control option
no. 3 (Table 9). To meet the SIL requirement, the BSR failure
rate should be decreased to 22% of the current failure rate
from the control option no. 3.5.2. Control option for HEFThe pod was the only component to be dominant within the
HEF results for both the A/PR and BSR functions (control
option no. 0 in Fig. 12). The selected PFD control options
were performance improvement to reduce the failure rate
because the PFD is evaluated based on both failure rate and
test interval (Eq. (1)). However, the test interval shortening
doesn't always lead to more reliable system inherently. The
test is another demanding on a function, and more frequent
tests mean more demanding the system functioning. There-
fore, the control options for the test interval are excluded from
the analysis. The HEF control options also deal with failure
rate. To meet SIL 2 requirements for the two subsea BOP SIF,
the HEF should decrease to approximately 3% of the current
HEF for the A/PR function and the BSR function (control
option no. 4 of Table 10). To that end, the 5% of the pod
failure rate (control option no. 2 in Table 10) or the three pods
system with the 12% of the pod failure rate (control option no.
3 in Table 10) should be guaranteed. However, these control
options couldn't meet the SIL requirement of the A/PR func-
tion. Additional control option was needed to the most
dominant component which was the HPU in control option no.
3 of Fig. 12 (a). To meet the SIL requirement, the HPU failure
rate should be decreased to 26% of the current HPU failure
rate. These HEF control options are more severe than those
suggested as PFD control options, which assumed that the SIS
demand rate is less than one per year (1.14e4 per hour).
Fig. 12. Sensitivity of components (green block for no. 1, blue comb pattern for no. 1 and red check pattern for no. 3 of Table 10). (a) component sensitivity of
event 2; (b) component sensitivity of event 5.
Table 10
Control options for HEF: aspect of the PFD.
No. Control option A/PR function (event 2) BSR function (event 5)
HEF SIL Reduction HEF SIL Reduction
0 Origin 3.03E05 0 0% 2.98E05 0 0%
1 3 Pod system 1.19E05 0 61% 1.14E05 0 62%
2 5% Pod failure rate 1.52E06 1 95% 9.99E07 2 97%
3 3 Pod & 12% Pod failure rate 1.51E06 1 95% 9.93E07 2 97%
4 3 Pod & 12% Pod failure rate
& 26% HPU failure rate
9.94E07 2 97% 9.93E07 2 97%
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than one per year (3.75e4 per hour) in Table 6. The pod is
one component of the A/PR system, and it is treated as being
in low demand mode even though it is not in that mode.
Therefore, compared to the HEF, the PFD could underestimate
the probability of failure of the two subsea BOP SIF.
6. Discussion
The HEF control options can consider the demand rate by
applying Eq. (3). The pod is the dominant component within
HEF and is applied in both the A/PR and BSR functions.
However, the demand rates of those two functions are quite
different (Table 6). A control option that separates the pod for
each function that is being demanded at a different demand
rate was investigated. Fig. 13 (a) shows the separated pod
system. In that system, the additional pod is demanded only
for the BSR function as, based on their function, the pods were
separate. Fig. 13 (b) shows a combined pod system. If the
separated BSR pod for the BSR function fails, then the blue
and yellow pods of the A/PR function can be used to actuate
the BSR preventer (such as is the case in the original subsea
BOP in Table 10). Note that the A/PR function cannot use the
separate BSR pod when the blue and yellow pods are broken.
The HEF results for the separated pod and the combined pod
systems can be evaluated via Eq. (27) and Eq. (28), respectively.HEFE5 ¼ PFD1oo2TPB$ðldeÞTPB þ PFD1oo2TCS$ðldeÞTCS
þ PFD1oo1Pod$ðldeÞBSR þ PFD1oo1BSR$ðldeÞBSR
ð27Þ
HEFE5 ¼ PFD1oo2TPB$ðldeÞTPB þ PFD1oo2TCS$ðldeÞTCS
þ PFD1oo2Pod$

PFD1oo1Pod$ðldeÞBSR

þ PFD1oo1BSR$ðldeÞBSR ð28Þ
The separate and combined pod systems produced no
difference in HEF values for the A/PR function (Table 11)
because the control options had the same pod configura-
tion for the A/PR function (Fig. 2). However, the HEF of
the BSR function reduced dramatically in both the sepa-
rate and combined pod systems without performance
improvement (Table 11). Note that the pod control options
presented in Table 10 were still needed for the A/PR
function.
The PFD evaluation could not utilize the suggested control
options (Fig. 13). Moreover, the PFD when applied to a SIS
demanded several times per year can underestimate the
probability of SIS failure. Technically, in such a case the PFH
should be used for that system's evaluation; regardless, PFD-
based evaluations are adopted widely. A HEF-based evalua-
tion can reflect demand rates near the boundary between low
and high demand modes.
Table 11
Control options for HEF: aspect of the demand rate.
No. Control option A/PR function (event 2) BSR function (event 5)
HEF SIL Reduction HEF SIL Reduction
0 Origin 3.03E05 0 0% 2.98E05 0 0%
1 Separated pod system 3.03E05 0 0% 8.50E06 1 71%
2 Combined pod system 3.03E05 0 0% 1.37E06 1 95%
Fig. 13. BSR pod for BSR function. (a) separated pod system; (b) combined pod system (the solid line is the function of the annulus and the pipe ram preventer
(referred as A/PR) and the dash line is the function of the blind shear ram preventer (referred as BSR)).
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The conclusions of the study are as followings.
 The HEF was proposed as an alternative SIS evaluation
indicator near the boundary of the PFD for the low de-
mand mode and the PFH for the high demand mode. As an
application, two functions of a subsea BOP were analyzed
based on the definitions within NOG 070. The PFD which
has been used as SIS evaluation indicator for the subsea
BOP functions was compared with the HEF. The results of
this study indicated the possibility of using HEF as a SIS
evaluation indicator near the boundary of the PFD and the
PFH applicability.
 It was found that evaluating a subsea BOP SIS via the
existing PFD approach could underestimate the probabil-
ity of failure of the subsea BOP SIS. The PFD, the prob-
ability of failure on demand, is used for the SIS evaluation
of the low demand mode and it assumes that the SIF is
required no greater than one per year. However, in the
most frequently occurring scenario of well kick control-
ling procedure, the A/PR function was not a low demand
mode operation. The BSR function was a low demand
mode, but the pod, which was the most dominant equip-
ment in the PFD evaluation of the BSR function, was usedas the demand rate of the A/PR function. Those are out of
the PFD range and the PFD may underestimate the prob-
ability of the failure at this demand rate range because the
more frequent demand leads to more chance to be failed.
 Several control options were suggested from the
perspective of PFD and HEF results. To meet the SIL
requirement of NOG 070, control options to reduce 88%
of the current PFD of the A/PR function and 89% of the
current PFD of the BSR function were needed based on
the PFD results. In the case of the HEF, 97% reductions
from the current HEF were needed for both A/PR function
and BSR function. The control option for the BSR pre-
venter from the PFD evaluation and the control option for
the HPU from the HEF evaluation should be delivered
additional to control options for the pod systems.
Two research topics are suggested as future works. Firstly, it
is to consider the effect of the circumstance to the technical
systems. This study applied the effect of the different circum-
stance only on the operators (2A and 2B, 5A and 5B in Table 5)
due to lack of data. However, the technical system could be
affected by the circumstance and the failure rate could be
changed. This can lead to the different PFD and the demand
rate. The result will be closer to the real situation. Another topic
is to consider the imperfect tests having the different test
276 S. Chung et al. / International Journal of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering 8 (2016) 262e276intervals. This study assumed that one kind of the test was
performed every 6 months and the test was perfect to detect all
faults of the system. However, several different tests are per-
formed with different intervals in the industry. Also, sometimes
some faults can't be found by the test. If these conditions can be
applied to the analysis, the more realistic result can be obtained.
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